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Analysis of Influence of UAS Speed Range and Turn 
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Devin P. Jack1, Jeremy Hardy2, and Keith D. Hoffler3 
Adaptive Aerospace Group, Hampton, Virginia, 23666 
In support of NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace 
System project and RTCA Special Committee 228, an analysis has been performed to provide 
insight in to the trade space between unmanned aircraft speed and turn capability and detect 
and avoid sensor range requirements. The work was done as an initial part of the effort to 
understand low size, weight, and power sensor requirements for aircraft that have a limited 
speed envelope or can limit the envelope for portions of their mission and may be able to turn 
at higher than “standard rate.” Range and timeline reductions coming from limiting speed 
range and from increasing available turn rate in some speed ranges are shown.  
Nomenclature 
CPA = closest point of approach 
deg = degrees 
݀௫ = range in the x-dimension ݀௬ = range in the y-dimension 
dh = vertical separation 
DMOD = distance modifier 
ft = feet 
h = vertical separation threshold 
HMD = horizontal miss distance 
KCAS = knots calibrated airspeed 
KTAS = knots true airspeed 
r = horizontal range 
ݎሶ  = horizontal closure rate 
sec = second 
ݐ஼௉஺ = time to closest point of approach (CPA) ݐௗ௛ = time to achieve vertical separation ߬௠௢ௗ = modified tau ݒ௥௫ = relative velocity in the x-dimension ݒ௥௬ = relative velocity in the y-dimension 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into the U.S.’ National Airspace System (NAS) is highly 
desirable to many stakeholders across government, industry, and academia; maintaining the same level of safety 
currently in the NAS requires a means of replacing the manned aircraft pilot’s obligation to see-and-avoid other 
aircraft. RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC-228), a federal advisory committee consisting of public and private 
stakeholders, is developing minimum technical requirements for a detect-and-avoid (DAA) system to be used in lieu 
of a manned aircraft pilot’s see-and-avoid capability. A DAA system uses a suite of sensors, trackers, a detection 
algorithm, and display to provide the remotely located pilot with sufficient traffic situation awareness to avoid a loss 
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of separation with other aircraft. SC-228’s recently published minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) 
for DAA systems are outlined in DO-365 [1], while the accompanying MOPS for air-to-air radar are outlined in DO-
366 [2]. To make the problem more manageable, DO-365 and DO-366 were necessarily developed to support a limited 
set of UAS performance and operations. Ongoing work is intended to enable more types of UAS and support more 
complete operations.  
The development of DO-365 made assumptions on the speed range and maneuverability of the unmanned aircraft 
(UA). In current NAS operations, a turn rate of 3 deg/sec is considered a standard-rate turn and is expected by 
controllers for most maneuvers. For typical airspeeds in the NAS, this standard rate of turn keeps the accelerations 
experienced by the humans on-board to an acceptable level. To facilitate integration of UAS in the NAS, SC-228 
asserted that UA must be capable of turning at a rate no less than 3 deg/sec and gave no credit to the UA for being 
able to turn faster. The assumed speed range limited UA operations to between 40 and 200 KTAS while below 10,000 
ft above mean sea level (MSL). The worst case across the airspeed range drove the requirements giving no credit for 
a UA flying in a more limited speed range. Using these assumptions, range and time requirements were derived to 
define minimum sensor capability requirements and alert timing requirements. 
With no humans on-board the UA, turn performance does not need to be constrained for pilot and passenger 
comfort. A UAS could reasonably operate using turn rates much greater than 3 deg/sec, the standard rate for manned 
aircraft operations, but the current DO-365 requirements do not provide any benefit from turning faster. Similar to the 
approach used to derive the range and time requirements of the first edition of DO-365, a trade-space study has been 
performed to define the range and time requirements for a UA with improved turn rate capability. The results presented 
herein detail the range and time required to maintain DAA Well Clear as a function of sustained turn rate. The results 
are particularly applicable to sensors used to detect non-cooperative intruder aircraft. A non-cooperative aircraft is not 
equipped with an electronic means of broadcasting its state information either via an active surveillance transponder 
or an automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast out (ADS-B Out) system. Typically, non-cooperative sensors are 
much more limited in range capability than the cooperative sensors. The cost, size, weight, and power (C-SWAP) of 
non-cooperative sensors is very sensitive to the range at which established tracks are required; minimizing range will 
provide more flexibility in sensor development. 
The range requirement presented in DO-365 and DO-366 are driven by the 200 KTAS upper-bound, while the 
time requirement is driven by the lower bound of 40 KTAS. The upper bound of 200 KTAS was set in order to ensure 
that air-to-air radar could detect non-cooperative aircraft with sufficient distance to remain safely separated. The lower 
end of the assumed speed range was defined to limit the need for excessively large alerting times; slow moving aircraft 
have difficulty achieving the needed separation. Currently, UAS must meet the requirements associated with these 
speed bounds, regardless of whether they plan to only operate in a reduced speed range. Introducing multiple ‘bins’ 
of operational speed ranges may enable more UA to safely integrate into NAS operations.  
A key effort towards the development of DO-365 was the derivation of a quantitative definition of DAA Well 
Clear. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations Chapter 14, Part 91.113 (14 CFR 91.113) states that a pilot must remain well 
clear from other aircraft, but the definition of well clear is left to the pilot’s judgment and experience [3]. DAA Well 
Clear is a separation standard developed for use by UAS to comply with 14 CFR and is expanded upon in the following 
section. 
A. DAA Well Clear 
Per 14 CFR 91.113 [3], “vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid 
other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft 
and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.” Thus, utilizing an onboard pilot’s ability to see and 
avoid traffic, an aircraft must remain ‘well clear’ from other vehicles at all times. With a pilot onboard, the definition 
of well clear is qualitative, based on the ability, judgment, and preferences of the pilot in command. Without an 
onboard pilot, a quantitative definition of well clear is required to establish separation requirements for unmanned 
aircraft DAA systems. A quantitative definition of well clear provides a repeatable target for which a DAA system 
may support safe separation from other aircraft by providing information to the pilot or to automation. The DAA Well 
Clear volume is intended to include interoperability principles with respect to Air Traffic Control (ATC) operations 
and current collision avoidance systems such as the Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) [4]. To 
ensure interoperability with the current NAS, values used to define the DAA Well Clear volume must be large enough 
to avoid issuance of TCAS corrective resolution advisories [5] but not so large as to interfere with ATC separation 
services. This definition has been discussed and refined through a process involving NASA, Department of Defense 
(DoD), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and SC-228. 
The proposed definition of a DAA Well Clear volume is represented using the following inequality [1]: 
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  ሾ0 ൑ ߬௠௢ௗ ൑ ߬௠௢ௗ∗ ሿ	. ܽ݊݀. ሾܪܯܦ ൑ ܪܯܦ∗ሿ. ܽ݊݀. ሾ	െ݄∗ ൑ ݄݀ ൑ ݄∗ሿ  (1) 
where HMD is the kinematic projection of the minimum horizontal miss distance in feet, and dh is the vertical 
separation between the two aircraft involved in the encounter. In Eqs. 1 through 4, the lack of a superscript denotes 
the instantaneous value at any 
given time during the encounter. 
The superscript * denotes the value 
given as a threshold in the 
quantitative definition of well 
clear. Table 1 shows the numeric 
values used to define the DAA 
Well Clear threshold.  
The definition of modified tau, 
߬௠௢ௗ, is inherited from TCAS [5] 
and given in seconds by 
  ߬௠௢ௗ ൌ ஽ெை஽
మି௥మ
௥ሶ௥   (2) 
where TCAS defines DMOD as a horizontal distance threshold with varying values depending on the UA’s altitude 
and r = horizontal range and ݎሶ  = horizontal range rate between the two aircraft. For the purposes of the DAA Well 
Clear definition, HMD* is used in place of DMOD in Equation 2.  
The predicted horizontal miss distance is represented as: 
  ܪܯܦ ൌ ටሺ݀௫ ൅ ݒ௥௫ݐ஼௉஺ሻଶ ൅ ൫݀௬ ൅ ݒ௥௬ݐ஼௉஺൯ଶ  (3) 
where ݀௫ is the horizontal separation in the x-dimension, ݀௬ is the horizontal separation in the y-dimension, ݒ௥௫ is the 
relative horizontal velocity in the x-dimension, and ݒ௥௬ is the relative horizontal velocity in the y-dimension. The 
parameter ݐ஼௉஺ is the time to closest point of approach (CPA) and is calculated as: 
  ݐ஼௉஺ ൌ ݉ܽݔ ൬0,െ ௗೣ௩ೝೣାௗ೤௩ೝ೤௩ೝమೣ ା௩ೝ೤మ ൰  (4) 
In Eq. 1, the horizontal separation requirements are segregated from the vertical separation requirements. In other 
words, if an aircraft is adequately separated in the vertical plane to avoid a loss of DAA Well Clear, the horizontal 
separation has no effect, and vice versa. Fig. 1 shows a simplified notional depiction of the DAA Well Clear definition, 
though its actual shape is more complex. The figure also separates horizontal (Fig. 1a) and vertical (Fig. 1b) separation 
requirements.  
In the horizontal dimension, both time and distance constraints must be violated in order to have a loss of DAA 
Well Clear; whereas, in the vertical dimension, violation of only the distance constraint will result in a loss of DAA 
Well Clear (DWC). 
In the horizontal dimension, as shown in Fig. 1a, the aircraft must remain outside of a time-based boundary (߬௠௢ௗ∗ ) 
unless the projected minimum distance between the two aircraft is greater than the specified HMD*. The HMD is a 
kinematic projection using the velocity vectors of the ownship and intruder aircraft. Thus, the maneuvering aircraft 
must turn to a heading that achieves a projected value of HMD greater than HMD* to maintain DWC as opposed to 
being physically offset by a distance of HMD*. The angle that provides the required HMD projection varies greatly 
with the initial range between the encountering aircraft. 
Table 1. DAA Well-Clear definition. 
Parameter  Symbol  Units  Value 
Vertical Displacement  h*  feet  450 
Modified Tau  ߬௠௢ௗ∗   seconds  35 
Horizontal Miss Distance  HMD*  feet  4000 
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In the vertical plane, as 
shown in Fig. 1b, the aircraft 
must remain outside of a spatial 
boundary defined by ±h*. In 
contrast to the horizontal 
separation requirements, the 
vertical separation is not a 
projection but an absolute 
vertical distance between the 
aircraft. Since the vertical 
boundary is fixed, the time 
required to reach the specified 
vertical separation h*, or ݐௗ௛, 
must be analyzed.  
Note this paper focuses on 
the horizontal dimensions of 
DWC. 
B. Maneuver Initiation 
Reference Frame 
When defining range and 
time requirements for 
maneuvering to maintain DWC, 
it is important to consider the 
reference frame being used. The 
initial requirements presented in 
Appendix D of DO-365 [1] 
measure the range and time relative to the intruder aircraft, as shown in Fig. 2. This figure shows a notional depiction 
of the encounter geometry and DWC volume (dashed red). The figure indicates that the maneuver initiation range 
(MIR) and ݐ஼௉஺ are measured relative to the intruder. Note that for simplicity the figure does not accurately depict the ݐ஼௉஺ measurement, as this would more accurately be represented measured to the CPA point rather than the intruder 
position. This reference frame is of interest primarily for sensor measurements; an air-to-air radar directly measures 
the position of the intruder aircraft and has no means of detecting a DWC volume.  
In contrast to the intruder-centric measurements shown in Fig. 2, the range and time may be measured relative to 
a loss of DAA well clear (LoWC) and written as RLoWC and tLoWC respectively. Fig. 3 shows a notional depiction of 
the range and time measured relative to the DWC volume. This reference frame is preferable for timing assessments 
primarily due to the fact that DO-365 alerting requirements are generally provided as X seconds prior to LoWC.  
Of these four parameter definitions, the two of primary interest are the range measured with respect to the intruder 
aircraft, MIR, and the time measured relative to the DWC volume, ݐ௅௢ௐ஼. Using these two parameters, the sensor 
range requirements can be derived from the MIR, and the alerting timeline contribution of the UAS maneuver may be 
assessed using the ݐ௅௢ௐ஼. This reference frame is used herein and is proposed for subsequent versions of DO-365 and 
related documents. 
 
Fig. 2 Range and time depicted relative 
to intruder aircraft. 
 
Fig. 3. Range and time depicted relative to 
DAA Well Clear Volume. 
 
(a) Horizontal components of DAA Well Clear 
 
 
(b) Vertical components of DAA Well Clear 
 
Fig. 1 Simplified depiction of DAA Well Clear 
߬௠௢ௗ∗ 	ݔ	ܴܴܽ݊݃݁ܽݐ݁
ܪܯܦ∗
߬௠௢ௗ∗ 	ݔ	ܴܴܽ݊݃݁ܽݐ݁
േ	݄∗
ݐௗ௛
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II. General Approach 
A. Encounter Description 
The 2-degrees-of-freedom Prototyping Aircraft Interaction Research Simulation (2PAIRS) [6] tool was used to 
analyze pairwise encounters involving a maneuvering UA and a constant trajectory non-cooperative intruder. The two 
aircraft are initially flying on a direct collision course (CPA = 0 feet). Initially trimmed to unaccelerated flight, the 
UA begins rolling into the specified turn rate immediately at the start of the simulation. The UA maintains the specified 
rate of turn until leveling out when a heading change of 90 degrees is achieved. The scenario continues until CPA has 
occurred and the aircraft are diverging.  
A limiting factor in the design of a DAA system is the range capability of the air-to-air radar, the primary means 
of detecting a non-cooperative aircraft. The MIR is much less than the sensor capabilities for cooperative aircraft that 
actively broadcast their positions using ADS-B or an active surveillance transponder; therefore, cooperative intruders 
were not analyzed. For this reason, the intruder aircraft is modelled as a representative non-cooperative aircraft flying 
at 170 KTAS. This airspeed is found to be the 95th percentile airspeed for non-cooperative aircraft in the NAS [7]. 
Further, the encounters are setup to occur at 10,000 feet MSL, the maximum operating altitude for non-cooperative 
aircraft [3]. Using the maximum operating altitude provides the highest true airspeed when converting from calibrated 
airspeed (such as the statute speed limit). 
. 
B. Experiment Design 
The UA turn rate and UA operational speed range are the primary independent variables of this study. For UA turn 
rate, integer values from standard rate (3 deg/sec) up to 12 deg/sec were analyzed. The UA airspeed was varied from 
20 – 250 KCAS or about 25 – 291 KTAS at 10,000 ft MSL. The lower bound of 20 KCAS is based on subject matter 
expertise and a survey of UA operator performance capabilities. The upper bound of 250 KCAS is the statute speed 
limitation for aircraft below 18,000 feet MSL [3].  
An additional independent variable for this experiment is the initial time to CPA, ݐ஼௉஺. Using the defined airspeeds 
and head-on geometry, time to CPA effectively defines the initial range between the two aircraft. This parameter was 
varied between 1 and 125 seconds in 1 second increments.  
The primary metrics captured during each simulation run include a Boolean flag indicating a LoWC, the initial 
time to LoWC, and the initial positions of the UA and intruder aircraft. These four parameters were key to this analysis, 
but additional state information was captured using 2PAIRS. 
The results presented herein are the minimum time and range the UA needs to maintain DWC and does not account 
for pilot response time, data link delay, control surface deflection delay, and other delays that may occur. Additional 
time and range must be added to account for these delays present during normal UA operations. 
III. Results 
The Maneuver Initiation Range, the range at which a maneuver must be initiated to avoid penetration of the DAA 
Well Clear boundary, as a function of UA turn rate and airspeed is presented in Fig. 4. Maneuver Initiation Range is 
shown in nautical miles on the y-axis, UA airspeed is shown in knots true airspeed (KTAS) on the x-axis, and UA 
turn rate is represented by the color of the line. The vertical dashed lines indicate the airspeed at which the UA is 
performing a maneuver at a bank angle greater than 60 degrees for the matching-color turn rate. A bank angle of 60 
degrees is significant because it requires 2 g or more for level flight and the FAA classifies such maneuvers as aerobatic 
maneuvers [3]. Similarly, Fig. 5 shows the maneuver initiation time, the time at which a maneuver must be initiated 
to avoid a penetration of the DAA Well Clear boundary.  
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The top curve (red) within Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 represents the time and range requirements for the initial edition of 
DO-365 but with the time reference standard proposed above. As can be seen in Fig. 4, the range requirement increases 
drastically as the airspeed decreases below 50 KTAS; analysis of this type of figure was used to limit the UA airspeed 
to between 40 and 200 KTAS in the initial edition of DO-365. 
A. Speed Range Effect 
One method to reduce the maneuver initiation range requirements below those in DO-365 and DO-366 is to further 
restrict the UA operational speed range. The assumed operational speed range of UAS in DO-365 is between 40 and 
200 KTAS. The range requirement associated with the non-cooperative sensor is driven by the maximum MIR across 
that entire speed range, regardless of whether the applicant UA plans to operate across that entire range. An option to 
reduce the MIR requirement is to reduce the associated operational speed range.  
 
Fig. 4 Maneuver initiation range to remain DAA Well Clear vs. unmanned aircraft 
airspeed. 
 
Fig. 5. Maneuver initiation time to LoWC to remain DAA Well Clear vs unmanned 
aircraft airspeed. 
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Table 2 shows the maneuver initiation range and 
time to LoWC required to maintain DWC for a variety 
of operational speed ranges. Table 2 captures the 
following speed ranges: less than 40 KTAS representing 
very slow moving aircraft whose operations focus on 
long endurance flights; 25-291 KTAS encompassing the 
statute speed range with a very low-end speed; 40-115 
KTAS typical of a mid-size aircraft; 40-200 KTAS 
representing the current DO-365 operational speed 
range; and 45-75 KTAS representing an aircraft that 
intends to stay in a lower speed range. 
Table 2 shows that the range and time required to 
maintain DWC increases for operational speed ranges 
that extended beyond the legacy DO-365 speed range of 
40-200 KTAS. However, reducing the operational 
speed range within the legacy DO-365 bounds is an 
effective way of reducing range and time required to maintain DWC. The most restrictive speed range (45 to 75 
KTAS) provides the most benefit in reducing the maneuver initiation requirements, but this speed range may be 
difficult to achieve during flight. Since ݐ௅௢ௐ஼ is monotonically decreasing as UA airspeed increases, the maximum ݐ௅௢ௐ஼ is driven by the low-end speed of any operational speed range. This same trend does not carry over to the MIR 
trend.  
B. Turn Rate Effect 
An alternative method of reducing the maneuver initiation range and time to LoWC is to credit aircraft capable of 
turning faster than 3 deg/sec. In Fig. 54, the range required for aircraft at 100 KTAS turning at 3 deg/sec is 3.57 nmi. 
If that aircraft operating at the same speed is capable of a 12 deg/sec turn (shown in Fig. 4 as a magenta line at the 
bottom), the range required for its non-cooperative sensor is reduced to 3.12 nmi. Similarly, in Fig. 5 the time to 
LoWC at which a maneuver must be initiated is reduced from 11 sec to 4 sec. Table 3 shows the effect of increasing 
the turn rate assumption for three example aircraft speeds: 40, 100 and 200 KTAS. Within Table 3, the low speed 
aircraft require a significant amount of additional time to maintain DWC. The time associated with these low speed 
aircraft are driven primarily by the HMD* parameter of the DWC definition. Generally, these aircraft perform a 
complete 90 degree turn and continue flying perpendicular to the intruder aircraft in order to create the needed lateral 
separation of HMD* feet.  
C. Effect of Turn Rate and Operational Speed Range 
The greatest reduction in MIR and ݐ௅௢ௐ஼ results from combining a more restrictive operational speed range and 
increased turn rate assumptions. Table 4, shown below, shows the MIR and ݐ௅௢ௐ஼ required to maintain DWC for 
several combinations of turn rate and operational speed range. In general, range and time requirements are inversely 
proportional to turn rate. 
As previously discussed and shown here to be true for all of the presented turn rates, the maximum ݐ௅௢ௐ஼ is driven 
by the low-end speed of any operational speed range.  
Table 2 Effect of operational speed range on 
maneuver initiation range and time to 
LoWC. 
Operational 
Speed Range 
(KTAS) 
૜˚ ࢙ࢋࢉൗ  
MIR (nmi)  ࢚ࡸ࢕ࢃ࡯ (sec) 
25‐40  5.26  59 
25‐291  5.43  59 
40‐115  3.68  24 
40‐200  4.47  24 
45‐75  3.47  20 
 
Table 3 Effect of turn rate on maneuver initiation range and time to LoWC. 
Turn Rate 
(deg/sec) 
40 KTAS  100 KTAS  200 KTAS 
MIR 
(nmi) 
࢚ࡸ࢕ࢃ࡯ 
(sec) 
MIR 
(nmi) 
࢚ࡸ࢕ࢃ࡯ 
(sec) 
MIR 
(nmi) 
࢚ࡸ࢕ࢃ࡯ 
(sec) 
3  3.65  24  3.57  11  4.47  8 
7  3.24  17  3.18  5  4.26  5 
12  3.16  16  3.12  4  4.24  5 
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IV. Application 
As previously discussed, increasing the turn rate assumption and modifying the operational speed range are both 
effective methods of reducing the maneuver initiation range and time to LoWC. An initial attempt to define UAS 
performance groups based on this analysis is presented in Fig. 6. The figure shows the MIR from Fig. 4 overlaid with 
four UAS performance groups: low-speed group, a mid-speed group, the legacy DO-365 operational speed range, and 
a high-speed group.  
On the low end of the operational speed range, Fig. 6 depicts a low-speed group operating below 40 KTAS. Aircraft 
operating within this speed range are generally characterized as high-altitude, long-endurance aircraft with very sleek 
profiles when not maneuvering. Since these aircraft take such a significant amount of time and distance in order to 
maintain DWC, special considerations with respect to the alerting timeline and required separation are needed. 
As seen in Table 4, certain speed ranges have a greater benefit to increasing the turn rate beyond the standard 3 
deg/sec; specifically, the mid-speed ranges of 40-115 KTAS and 45-75 KTAS. Fig. 6 shows the mid-speed group 
encompassing 40-115 KTAS. Increasing the minimum turn rate from 3 to 7 deg/sec may provide sufficient reduction 
in non-cooperative sensor requirement so as to enable an increased number of aircraft to operate within this speed 
range. There is limited benefit of increasing the turn rate beyond 7 deg/sec. Increasing the turn rate assumption to 12 
deg/sec may be more difficult to achieve in terms of system design of the UAS with limited additional benefit 
Table 4 Effect of operational speed range on maneuver initiation range and time to LoWC for 
3, 7, and 12 deg/sec turn rates. 
Operational 
Speed Range 
(KTAS) 
૜˚ ࢙ࢋࢉൗ   ૠ˚ ࢙ࢋࢉൗ   ૚૛˚ ࢙ࢋࢉൗ  
MIR 
(nmi) 
࢚ࡸ࢕ࢃ࡯ 
(sec) 
MIR 
(nmi) 
࢚ࡸ࢕ࢃ࡯ 
(sec) 
MIR 
(nmi) 
࢚ࡸ࢕ࢃ࡯ 
(sec) 
25‐40  5.26  59  4.94  53  4.88  52 
25‐291  5.43  59  5.27  53  5.26  52 
40‐115  3.68  24  3.33  17  3.29  16 
40‐200  4.47  24  4.26  17  4.24  16 
45‐75  3.47  20  2.96  12  2.88  10 
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For aircraft capable of carrying non-cooperative sensors that outperform the minimum requirements specified in 
DO-366, there may be added operational benefit to flying at speeds greater than 200 KTAS. This high-speed group 
requires greater MIR than the legacy DO-365 performance group. This group differs from the other UAS performance 
groups since these UAS can be characterized as having greater system performance than those in the legacy DO-365 
system; whereas the low- and mid-speed performance groups are unable to meet legacy DO-365 performance 
requirements. The recommended performance groups are designed to enable a higher number and variety of UAS to 
successfully integrate into current NAS operations. 
V. Conclusion 
To enable the safe integration of an increased number and variety of UAS in to the U.S.’ NAS, this paper outlines 
two methods of reducing the minimum range and time at which a maneuver must be initiated to maintain a UAS-
specific separation standard, termed DAA Well Clear. The two methods for reducing these requirements outlined were 
increasing the assumed minimum turn rate for UAS and modifying the operational speed range. Beyond showing the 
impact of these two methodologies, a series of recommend groups based on UAS operational speed range and turn 
rate were outlined.  
  
 
 
Fig. 6 Recommended UAS performance groups. 
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